The Greenium matters: greenhouse gas emissions, environmental disclosures, and stock prices by ALESSI LUCIA et al.
The Greenium matters: 
greenhouse gas emissions, 
environmental disclosures, and 
stock prices 
Alessi Lucia 
Ossola Elisa 
Panzica Roberto 
First version: July 2019 
This version: April 2020 
JRC Working Papers in Economics and Finance, 2019/12 
This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science 
and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking 
process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither 
the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that 
might be made of this publication. 
Contact information 
Name: Alessi Lucia 
Address: JRC, via Fermi 2749, 21027 Ispra, Italy 
Email: Lucia.ALESSI@ec.europa.eu 
Name: Ossola Elisa 
Address: JRC, via Fermi 2749, 21027 Ispra, Italy 
Email: Elisa.OSSOLA@ec.europa.eu  
Name: Panzica Roberto 
Address: JRC, via Fermi 2749, 21027 Ispra, Italy 
Email: Roberto.PANZICA@ec.europa.eu  
EU Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
JRC120506 
PDF ISBN 978-92-76-18134-7 ISSN 2467-2203 doi:10.2760/49586 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020 
© European Union, 2020 
The reuse policy of the European Commission is implemented by the Commission Decision 2011/833/EU of 12 
December 2011 on the reuse of Commission documents (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). Except otherwise 
noted, the reuse of this document is authorised under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0) licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This means that reuse is allowed provided 
appropriate credit is given and any changes are indicated. For any use or reproduction of photos or other 
material that is not owned by the EU, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders.
All content © European Union, 2020 
How to cite this report: Alessi L., Ossola E. and Panzica R., The Greenium matters: greenhouse gas emissions, 
environmental disclosures, and stock prices, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020, 
ISBN 978-92-76-18134-7, doi:10.2760/49586, JRC120506 
The Greenium matters:
greenhouse gas emissions, environmental disclosures, and stock prices∗
Lucia Alessi1,2, Elisa Ossola1, and Roberto Panzica1
1European Commission, Joint Research Centre
2CefES – Center for European Studies (Universita` degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca)
April 2020
Abstract
This study provides evidence on the existence of a negative Greenium, i.e. a risk premium linked to firms’
greenness and environmental transparency, based on European individual stock returns. We define a priced
‘greenness and transparency’ factor based on companies’ greenhouse gas emissions and the quality of their
environmental disclosures. Based on this factor, we offer a tool to assess the exposure of a portfolio to the risk
associated with the low-carbon transition, and hedge against it. We estimate that in a stressed scenario where
greener and more transparent firms very much outperform brown stocks, there would be losses at the global
level, including for European large banks, should investors fail to price climate-transition risks. These results
call for the introduction of climate stress tests for systemically important financial institutions.
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1 Introduction
Climate change is a fact, but we are not sure what the economic costs associated with this change will be.1 By the
same token, it is difficult to estimate what the economic benefits of doing something about it would be. In particular,
it would be hard to pin down the net present value of activities aimed at climate change adaptation and mitigation,
as well as those directed to broader environmental objectives such as the sustainable use and protection of water
and marine resources, the transition to a circular economy, waste prevention and recycling, pollution prevention
and control, and the protection of healthy ecosystems.2 At the same time, the consequences of a transition to a
low-carbon, resource-efficient and circular economy, or lack thereof, are also largely uncertain. Hence, these issues
have to be addressed as aspects of long-run risk. The contribution of this paper is to measure the added value of
greener economic activities in terms of market excess returns. To do so, we first show that indeed, the European
market prices climate risk in the form of a greenness and environmental transparency factor, in the context of a
standard asset pricing model. Second, we estimate that the market associates a negative risk premium, which we
label Greenium, to more environmentally friendly and transparent firms.
We identify the greenness and transparency factor based on a precise definition. In particular, we first construct
portfolios characterized by a different shade of green and a different degree of environmental transparency. This
is based on firm-level information on greenhouse gas (GHG) or CO2 emissions, combined with a measure of the
completeness of firms’ environmental disclosures, to yield a synthetic greenness and transparency index for each
stock. Companies which disclose a lower emission intensity, and are very transparent, attain the highest scores and
are included in a greener and more transparent portfolio. The most straightforward example of greener companies
would be those with a large share of their turnover in green economic sectors, e.g. renewable energy. Conversely,
companies which do not disclose information on their environmental performance are labeled as non-transparent.
Among these nontransparent companies, those active in carbon-intensive sectors, e.g. companies operating coal
power plants, are included in a brown portfolio. The greenness and transparency factor is constructed based on 942
companies listed on the STOXX Europe Total Market Index.
By relying on company-level disclosures and factoring-in their transparency, we try to tackle the issue of green-
washing, which is likely to be the reason why the literature has so far failed to find a consensus on the existence of a
priced green factor. Indeed, looking at the actual composition of the portfolios of publicly traded investment funds
which label themselves as ‘green’ or ‘sustainable’, it turns out that many funds are clearly less environmentally
friendly than their name would suggest. For example, a fund might indeed limit its exposure to carbon-intensive
sectors, but at the same time mainly invest in e.g. financial stocks. Banks, insurers and other financial institutions
are admittedly directly responsible for a very small fraction of GHG emissions, but financial institutions are prob-
1On the uncertainty on the rate of increase in average temperatures in the long-medium horizon, and on the effects of climate change,
see e.g. Pindyck (2013).
2These objectives are listed in the European Commission Action plan on financing sustainable growth, which sets out an EU strategy
for sustainable finance.
2
ably not what comes to mind when thinking of companies that are at the forefront of efforts to reduce emissions.
At the level of the individual company, there could be a tendency to disclose only partial information, emphasizing
the environmental dimensions where the firm performs best and neglecting those where the firm does not as well.
For example, a car manufacturer may report its scope 1 GHG emissions, i.e. emissions from sources that it owns or
controls, but could have an incentive not to disclose its scope 3 emissions, which include emissions resulting from
the use of the vehicles it produces and sells. By considering the completeness of the relevant information that firms
disclose, we deal with this type of greenwashing.
At the same time, however, one should be careful not to take extreme views when defining ‘green’ stocks. As a
matter of fact, portfolio diversification is crucial for asset managers, and concentrating the exposure on a small set
of pure green players is not a viable option. Our society will still need e.g. steel and cement for quite a while, and
companies’ low-carbon transition is a much needed but gradual process. For all these reasons, a sensible approach
would be to broaden the scope of the definition of ‘green’ beyond pure players to also include firms that meet the
highest level of energy efficiency and the lowest CO2 emissions within the relevant sector. By taking this approach,
a steel manufacturer which also uses scrap steel is greener than one that does not. By the same token, an energy
company that reduces its reliance on fossil fuels – though not having an entirely renewable energy mix – is greener
than one that is not reducing its carbon footprint. This is the approach taken by several providers of environmental
ratings, which assess the sustainability of firms relative to their peers, and also the one we take in this paper.
We show that in the context of a standard asset pricing model, the portfolios we build based on firms’ environ-
mental performance and disclosures are associated with a positive intercept, suggesting the existence of an omitted
factor. Based on this evidence, we propose to include a greenness and transparency factor, which we construct
based on a long-short strategy involving the greener and more transparent portfolio and the brown portfolio. We
find that the Greenium, i.e. the risk premium associated with this greenness and transparency factor, is negative
and highly statistically significant. This means that investors accept a lower remuneration for their investments,
ceteris paribus, insofar as these investments are linked to greener and more transparent firms. We interpret this as
evidence of climate risk being viewed as significant, with the market seeing value in investing in greener assets as
a hedging strategy towards worse environmental outcomes. Indeed, in a scenario of heightened risks resulting from
climate change, there would be a stronger push towards more environmentally friendly activities, with more decisive
political action likely to be taken to promote sustainable growth. Hence, companies active in green sectors and more
transparent on their environmental performance would operate in a more favorable environment, possibly supported
by incentives, e.g. fiscal or of other nature. At the same time, the likelihood would increase that some assets, e.g.
coal, would become stranded. In this context, forward-looking investors who base their portfolio allocation on a
broader information set than past returns, invest in greener assets already today.
The evidence we provide on the existence of a Greenium has clear financial stability implications. Indeed, we
show that the European market as a whole does price climate risk. In this context, if an investor does not factor in
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climate risk in the construction of her portfolio, she is in fact pricing her holdings based on a misspecified model,
where the greenness and environmental transparency factor is omitted. Should this mispricing affect the assets
held by systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) such as large banks, insurers and pension funds, there
could be consequences in terms of systemic risk. In particular, asset returns on their holdings could be negatively
affected by climate change via two main channels. First, in a longer horizon perspective, more frequent and severe
natural catastrophes stemming from climate change (e.g. typhoons and floods) could negatively affect returns
on assets linked to particularly vulnerable economic activities.3 These are the so-called physical risks related to
climate change, that we do not tackle in this paper directly. However, it has been shown that rising temperatures
have strong adverse effects on asset valuations, as well as on key macroeconomic aggregates and productivity (see
Donadelli et al., 2017). Second, in a medium-term perspective, the implementation of sustainable finance policies
will imply higher costs for firms with higher emissions, causing a generalized drop in the dividend that brown firms
will be able to pay to their shareholders. In parallel, carbon-intensive assets will increasingly become ‘stranded’
(see Campiglio et al., 2017). This is the so-called transition risk. These two channels characterize a climate risk
factor that investors should price. Given the lack of data on the exposure of individual companies to physical risks
related to climate change, in this analysis we focus on transition risks, i.e. the potential impacts of a shift to a
lower carbon-footprint economy on firms active in climate-policy-relevant sectors.
Based on our model, we estimate that in an extreme but plausible scenario where greener and more transparent
companies outperform brown companies, all institutional sectors at the global level, including e.g. governments,
non-financial institutions and financial corporations, as well as all European SIFIs, would be hit by losses. By halving
their exposure to carbon-intensive sectors and reallocating their investments towards greener assets, investors could
somewhat reduce the loss. However, they could only avoid losing money if they would reallocate their investments
towards greener and more transparent firms. The magnitude of the expected losses we estimate is admittedly not
breathtaking. Still, we show that no one is in a safe place when it comes to climate risk, as the consequences of brown
asset mispricing would be widespread. Moreover, our analysis is limited to equity holdings, that for some investors
are not as relevant as other types of exposures. In a stressed scenario, however, losses would almost certainly
be recorded also on the bond portfolio and notably, on banks’ loan exposure. Finally, we use a simple model to
compute losses, based on the marginal expected shortfall. This approach does not factor in losses resulting from
second-round effects, like fire sales, which could magnify first-round losses. Taking all this into account, we conclude
that a climate or climate-policy shock could have serious implications in terms of financial stability, especially if
coupled with shocks of other nature. Hence, we argue that a climate stress test is warranted for systemically
important institutions to monitor their resilience to climate change. The greenness and transparency factor we
construct could indeed be used by investors, to hedge against climate risk, and by supervisors, to measure SIFIs
exposure to this risk. Notice that looking ahead, we can only expect greater policy pressure to reducing carbon
3See Daniel et al. (2016).
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emissions and moving to a sustainable development path.4
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of the relevant literature. In
Section 3, we present our synthetic greenness and transparency indicator at the level of the individual company.
Section 4 outlines the asset pricing theoretical framework. In Section 5, we present the results of the empirical
application. First, we focus on portfolios by estimating the standard asset pricing models and defining the greenness
and transparency factor. Then, we estimate our proposed model on individual stocks. In Section 6 we carry out a
battery of robustness checks. Section 7 tests the performance of the equity portfolios of global institutional sectors
and European SIFIs in a climate-stressed scenario. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper stands at the crossroad of sustainable finance, asset pricing and financial stability. The sustainable
finance literature has so far mostly focused on corporate performance, starting from the seminal work by Bragdon
and Marlin (1972). They asked the fundamental question, whether there would be a reward for a company’s
virtue. Trying to answer this question, Porter (1991), Gore (1993), and Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue
that improving a company environmental performance can lead to a better economic or financial performance, not
necessarily accompanied by an increase in costs. Ambec and Lanoie (2008) review several empirical works showing
that improvements in the environmental performance of a firm tend to be associated with improvements in its
economic or financial performance, owing to potential revenue increases and/or cost cuts. More recently, Hoepner
et al. (2018) show that engagement on sustainability issues can benefit shareholders’ by reducing firms’ downside
risks.
Despite increasingly available evidence on the performance of green or sustainable corporates, however, no con-
sensus has yet been reached in the asset pricing literature about the performance of green assets, or on environmental
risk being a priced macro factor. Evidence based on a large number of studies on the performance of sustainable
investment funds compared with conventional peers (e.g., Statman, 2000; Renneboog et al., 2007; Seitz, 2010) is
mixed. For example, Hartzmark and Sussman (2019) find that sustainability is viewed as positively predicting
future performance; however, they do not find evidence of outperformance of ‘high sustainability’ investment funds
vs ‘low sustainability’ ones. Trinks et al. (2018) show that divesting from fossil fuels does not impair portfolio per-
formance. On the contrary, Bolton and Kacperczyk (2019) find that stocks of companies with higher CO2 emission
intensity earn higher returns. Other analyses based on publicly traded environmental portfolios find that green
stocks are, on average, underperforming the market. This finding would indicate that investors are willing to earn
comparatively less on these assets because they are hedging an environmental long-run risk. Finally, recent papers
attempt to build climate risk hedging portfolios (see Engle et al., 2020, Choi et al., 2020, Hong et al., 2019, Alok
4Andersson et al. (2016) shows that divestment in higher emission stocks entails a cost, which investors are more likely to bear the
stronger the perception of a serious commitment on the side of policymakers towards fighting climate change.
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et al., 2020 and Goergen et al., 2019, Monasterolo and De Angelis, 2020); however, none of these works goes all the
way to quantifying the associated risk premium.
Finally, the financial stability literature has started to put forward the idea of ‘climate stress tests’ on the
exposures of financial institutions (see Battiston et al., 2017 and Battiston and Monasterolo, 2018), as well as to
develop climate stress-test methodologies for e.g. loan portfolios (see Monasterolo et al., 2018). Central Banks and
international institutions, starting with the seminal speech by Carney (2015), have also emphasized on different
occasions that climate change could affect systemic risk. In particular, Gros et al. (2016) distinguishes between a
benign scenario, with a gradual transition to a low-carbon economy, and an adverse scenario, where the transition
occurs more abruptly. In both cases, there could be financial stability consequences: with a too slow transition,
the Paris Agreement goal would be missed and the catastrophic consequences of climate change would become
unavoidable.5 A too quick transition, on the other hand, would imply a sudden repricing of brown assets. We
provide evidence that these concerns are shared by the market.
3 Synthetic greenness and transparency indicator
Different indicators are available to assess a company’s commitment to the environment. However, identifying
synthetic proxies for firms’ environmental performance is not obvious and no consensus has yet been reached in
the literature on this issue (see Oikonomou et al., 2012). The main source of information in this respect are firms’
environmental disclosures, which are typically published by companies in their annual reports, or in separate Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility or Sustainability reports, as well as in dedicated ESG releases or Corporate Governance
reports. Based on these disclosures, investors distinguish companies that are doing green business from firms that
are not, or that are not transparent in this respect. However, a single indicator might not be sufficient to ensure
a careful assessment of a company’s environmental performance. Hence, we look at both of the following two di-
mensions: i) environmental transparency, related to the quality of firms’ environmental disclosures, and ii) GHG
emissions.
As a proxy for the environmental transparency of a company we use the Bloomberg Environmental disclosure
score, which we refer to as E score.6 This is an index quantifying the completeness of a firm’s disclosure on its impact
on the environment. The E score embraces several environmental aspects of a firm’s business. In particular, it looks
at how transparent a company is with respect to its carbon emissions, air and water pollution, its commitment
to the protection of biodiversity, and its waste management, among others. The weighted E score is normalized
to range from zero for companies that do not disclose environmental data to 100 for those which disclose detailed
information for each pillar. The score is also tailored for industry sectors, and each component is weighted based
on its importance. In particular, GHG emission disclosure is attached the highest weight.
5The objective of the Paris Agreement, signed in 2015, is to keep a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
6MSCI, RobecoSAM, Sustainalytics and Asset4 also provide E disclosure scores based on different methodologies.
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We use the E score as a measure of the transparency of a firm with respect to its environmental sustainability
commitment, and assume that higher commitment is associated with higher transparency. In other words, based
on the E score, we make a first selection among firms that are transparent, at least to some extent, about their
environmental performance, and firms that are not. We do not claim that firms that do not disclose information
on environmental issues are necessarily ecologically destructive. However, we find it legitimate to label them as
non-green, as their environmental commitment appears weaker compared to firms that do disclose (quantitative)
information on this pillar. Moreover, Marquis et al. (2016) show that more environmentally friendly firms tend to
disclose more because they know that their environmental performance is generally better than the one of their
peers, while more environmentally damaging firms are indeed less likely to engage in non-mandatory disclosure, in
particular in those countries where they are more exposed to scrutiny and norms.
To build a comprehensive index of a company’s environmental performance, we combine this transparency
measure with quantitative disclosure on emissions. In particular, we consider the total GHG emission intensity,
i.e. the total amount on GHG emissions normalized by revenues. If this is not available, we take the total carbon
dioxide (CO2) emitted, weighted by revenues. The synthetic greenness and transparency indicator Gi,y of company
i at year y is defined as the weighted average of the two components, as follows:
Gi,y = γKi,y + (1− γ)Ei,y, with γ ∈ [0, 1], (1)
where Ki,y is the inverse of the ranking of firm i in term of emission intensity, and Ei,y is the ranking of firm i in
term of E score. The parameter γ controls for the relative importance of the two components of the index. We set
γ = 0.5 as benchmark case, and show results for γ = 0.2 and γ = 0.8 as robustness checks in Section 6.7 More
transparent companies, for a given level of intensity of GHG or CO2 emissions, are associated with larger values of
the indicator Gi,y. Firms that attain a lower emission intensity, for a given level of transparency, are also associated
with larger values of Gi,y.
Figure 1 shows the number of companies in our sample which did some environmental disclosure, from 2005 to
2017 (yellow bar). The figure also reports the number of firms that disclosed their emission intensity in a given year
(gray bar). The number of companies reporting on their environmental performance has exhibited an upward trend
in the last ten years, reaching around 700 EUROSTOXX companies in 2017, i.e. more than half of the sample.
The indicators we use to build the synthetic greenness and transparency indicator have some limitations. First,
the analysis provided in Section 5 includes data from 2005, while the Bloomberg ESG application was launched only
in 2009. This potentially introduces look-ahead bias (see, e.g., Derwall et al., 2005). However, this bias is mitigated
by the availability of firms’ environmental disclosures, including on GHG emissions, also prior to 2009. In other
words, market participants could start using the Bloomberg E score as such only as of 2009, but the information
7Figures 2 and 3 in the Appendix plot the greenness and transparency indicator, as well as its components, for two representative
companies.
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Figure 1: Total number of companies for which E score (yellow bar) and emission intensity (gray bar) are available.
this index is based on was already available to the market.8 A second issue relates to the self-reported nature of
GHG emissions, as well as of other environmental disclosures. As a matter of fact, the EU Non-Financial Reporting
Directive (NFRD) only requires auditors to verify the publication of non-financial disclosures by relevant firms, but
there are no assessment and verification requirements on the content of non-financial disclosures.9 Based on this,
we should emphasize that those firms we identify as greener based on their environmental disclosures may actually
be less green than they claim. Still, our asset pricing analysis should not be affected by this problem, insofar as
investors base their decisions only on publicly available information as we do. Related to the issue of self-reporting
is that of self-selection, due to the fact that unless firms are subject to the NFRD, they are free to choose whether to
disclose environmental information. Those that are subject to the NFRD, can choose what to disclose in particular.
Typically, self-selection may introduce a bias in the analysis. However, in our case self-selection works in the right
direction, as greener firms have an incentive to disclose more and in our framework, firms that are characterized
by a lower emission intensity and better environmental disclosures are correctly identified as greener and more
transparent. Still, we miss information on those firms that do not disclose. Finally, ESG ratings may differ quite
substantially across different data providers, as shown by a growing stream of empirical literature, including, among
others, Chatterji et al. (2016), Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2019), and Berg et al. (2019). This latter paper, for example,
shows that there is much more disagreement among raters on environmental ratings compared to credit ratings, but
still less compared to social and governance ratings. To partly account for the limited reliability of environmental
ratings and scores, we use the E score in combination with quantitative data on carbon emissions. We also show
8Performing the analysis from January 2010 to August 2018 yields empirical results in line with the ones provided in Section 5.
9See Directive 2014/95/EU. On this point, Short and Toffel (2008) document that firms tend to disclose more when they are immune
from prosecution for self-disclosed violations.
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that using only one or the other component of the greenness and transparency indicator does not yield meaningful
results (see Section 6).
Finally, among non-transparent firms, we further select a subsample that we label ‘brown’. These are companies
which are mainly active in sectors characterized by a comparatively higher level of carbon emissions. Information
on sectoral emissions in Europe is provided by Eurostat, at the NACE-2 digit level.10 Table 9 in the Appendix
lists the economic sectors responsible for the largest amount of carbon emissions in the EU. Overall, these sectors
account for 85% of the total GHG emissions in the EU over the 2008-2017 period. Table 10 in the Appendix lists
the companies that are included in the brown portfolio in 2017.
4 Linear factor model
We assume an approximate factor structure for excess returns combined with the absence of arbitrage opportunities
to obtain asset pricing restrictions. As the greenness and transparency indicator defined in Equation (1) is only
available for a relatively short sample, we opt for a time-invariant model, which assumes that the exposition of
an asset i to each observable factor does not evolve over time. We acknowledge that a model that accounts for
time variation in parameters and hence in risk premia would be best suited in this context, owing to the fact that
awareness on climate issues has increased over time. However, a time-varying model for the excess returns could
only be estimated on a much longer time series and a much larger cross-section than ours. Indeed, it would imply
introducing functional specifications for the coefficients, which would result in an incidental parameter problem.
Let us define the excess return on asset i = 1, ..., n at time t = 1, 2, ...T as Ri,t = ri,t − rf,t, where ri,t is the
log-return and rf,t is the risk-free return. We assume that the excess return Ri,t satisfies the following linear factor
model:
Ri,t = ai +
K∑
k=1
bi,kft,k + εi,t, (2)
where ft,k is the k-th observable factor, with k = 1, ...,K. The error term εi,t is s.t. E[εi,t|Ft−1] = 0, and
Cov[εi,t, ft|Ft−1] = 0, where Ft−1 is the lagged information set. The approximate factor structure holds for the
variance-covariance of the error terms, i.e., Σε,t,n = [Cov[εi,t, εj,t|Ft−1]]i,j=1,...,n with bounded largest eigenvalue
(see, e.g., Chamberlain and Rothschild, 1983). The following parameter restriction holds:11
ai =
K∑
k=1
bi,kνk, (3)
where νk is a parameter defined for each k-th factor. The asset pricing restriction in Equation (3) can be rewritten
as the usual linear relation between expected excess returns and risk premia:
10Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.
11We refer to Gagliardini et al. (2016) for theoretical results and proofs.
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E[Ri,t] =
K∑
k=1
bi,kλk. (4)
Based on Equations (3) and (4), the time-invariant risk premium associated to each k-th factor is the following:
λk = E[ft,k] + νk. (5)
The risk premium λk is the sum of the expected return on the factor, which can be estimated as its first moment,
plus the parameter νk, defined in the asset pricing restriction (3). Risk premia measure how much investors are
willing to pay to hedge the systematic risk captured by the observable factors. When the factors are asset returns
themselves (i.e., factors are tradable) and are assumed to be priced by the same model in (2), the risk premia
are equal to the factor means (see, e.g., Jagannathan and Wang, 2002). However, if factors are non tradable, the
parameter νk is non zero. Following Gagliardini et al. (2016), we do not assume a priori that the factors ft,k are
tradable. Hence, we allow for the existence of market imperfections, such as transactions costs due to rebalancing
and short selling, which are captured by ν (see e.g., Cremers et al., 2012).
Our baseline factor models are summarized in the table below.
Model Reference Abbreviation Factors K
Four-factor model Carhart (1997) CAR fm,t, fsmb,t, fhml,t, fmom,t 4
Three-factor model Fama and French (1993) 3FF fm,t, fsmb,t, fhml,t 3
Capital Asset Pricing Model Sharpe (1964); Lintner (1965) CAPM fm,t 1
The factors that are included in the models are the following: 1) fm,t is the market factor, defined as the excess
return on the European value-weighted market portfolio over the risk free rate; 2) fsmb,t is the size factor, defined
as the average return on small caps minus the average return on big caps; 3) fhml,t is the book-to-market factor,
defined as the average return on the value portfolio (i.e. stocks that have market value that is small relative to
the book value) minus the average return on the growth portfolio; 4) fmom,t is the momentum factor, defined as
the average of the returns for the winner portfolio, based on past returns, minus the average of the returns for
the loser portfolio. Fama and French (2015) propose a five-factor model including the three Fama-French factors
plus profitability and investment factors. However, we do not consider the five-factor model as four factors are
enough to explain excess returns in a time-invariant specification, as shown by Gagliardini et al. (2019). By analogy
with the fm,t factor, which is constructed based on the T-bill, we proxy the risk free rate with the 30-day T-bill
beginning-of-month yield. The time series of European factors and the risk free rate are available on Kenneth
French’s website.
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5 Empirical analysis
In this section, we first compare greener and more transparent portfolio and the brown portfolio based on the models
introduced in the previous section. Then, we propose an observable greenness and transparency factor defined as
the difference between the returns on the greener and more transparent portfolio and those on the brown portfolio.
Finally, we estimate the Greenium, i.e. the risk premium associated to the greenness and transparency factor, using
a set of European individual stocks. Our sample spans from January 2006 to August 2018, covering all individual
stocks included in the STOXX Europe Total Market Index (TMI) on August 2018.12 The STOXX Europe TMI
covers approximately 95% of the free float market capitalization across 17 European countries.13 In principle, we
could estimate our model on all 20K European listed firms. However, enlarging the sample would only marginally
increase its coverage in terms of market capitalization, while it may jeopardize the results owing to the quality of
the information that we would feed into the model. Indeed, the reliability of the data we use for our application
crucially depends on the quality of environmental disclosures of European firms. On this matter, the NFRD imposes
mandatory disclosures only on larger firms (with more than 500 employees). To be on the safe side, we construct
our greenness and transparency factor based on a sample which is more reliable in terms of data quality, insofar as
it is based on a market index, and still representative of the market as a whole. We present an application on a
much larger sample in Section 6.
As in Fama and French (2008), we exclude financial firms (i.e., companies classified in sectors with NACE code
K or L). The final dataset comprises n = 942 stocks. Stock returns and stock market capitalization data are sourced
from Bloomberg. The panel is unbalanced, i.e., asset returns are not available for all firms at all dates. To account
for publication lags, in each given year we use environmental disclosures for the previous reference year.
5.1 Portfolio analysis and the Greenness and Transparency Factor
As described in Section 3, we distinguish between transparent and non-transparent companies. The former belong
to set T while the latter belong to set T c. At each month t, we define the returns on the transparent and non-
transparent portfolios, i.e. r˜t and r˜
c
t , respectively, as follows:
r˜t =
∑
i∈T
wiri,t, and r˜
c
t =
∑
i∈T c
wiri,t, (6)
where the weight is defined as wi = MCi,t/
∑
t
MCi,t, with MCi,t being the market capitalization of stock i at
month t. Focussing on transparent firms, we study the returns on different portfolios characterized by different
shades of green and degrees of transparency. In particular, we build portfolios of returns r˜qt corresponding to the
quintiles q = 1, ..., 5 of the distribution of the greenness and transparency indicator considering only firms belonging
12This allows us to avoid survivor bias in the data.
13These are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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to T .14
The portfolio built on the fifth quintile includes top-ranked firms in terms of environmental performance and
disclosures and is labeled ‘greener and more transparent’ portfolio. The returns on this portfolio are indicated as
r˜gt .
15
Focussing on non-transparent firms, we build the brown portfolio by including companies in T c which are active
in one or more of the industries characterized by the highest emissions, as described in Section 3. The returns
on this portfolio are indicated as r˜bt . Table 12 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for firms included
in portfolios characterized by various shades of green and transparency. It shows that the various portfolios are
comparable in terms of average size of the companies and firms’ leverage, while firms in the non-transparent and
brown portfolio tend to have a slightly better RoA compared to greener and more transparent firms.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the returns on various portfolios, namely the one including all transparent
firms R˜, the greener and more transparent portfolio R˜g, the portfolio including all non-transparent firms R˜c, and
the brown portfolio R˜b. With respect to the relative performance of the various types of firms, and looking at the
mean return, the non-transparent portfolio has outperformed the others, followed by the brown and the transparent.
A sounder way to assess the performance of a portfolio is the Sharpe ratio, which relates the mean performance to
the standard deviation of the returns on a portfolio. In terms of Sharpe ratio, the non-transparent portfolio still
outperforms the others, which have a similarly better performance than the market. Neither the mean return nor
the Sharpe ratio are monotone in greenness and transparency, which is explained by the fact that the environmental
characterization of a portfolio is only one of the determinants of its performance (see below). Finally, the distribution
of returns for all the portfolios is characterized by excess kurtosis and negative skewness.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the returns from January 2006 to August 2018 on various portfolios, namely the
transparent R˜, greener and more transparent R˜g, non-transparent R˜c and brown R˜b portfolios. The table reports
the monthly mean and standard deviation (Std), kurtosis (Kurt) and skewness (Skew), the Sharpe ratio, and the
t-stat for the null hypothesis that the mean return is zero.
Portfolio Mean Std Kurt Skew Sharpe t-stat
R˜ 1.102 0.497 3.744 -0.391 0.204 2.522
R˜g 0.943 0.502 4.097 -0.593 0.188 2.315
R˜c 1.732 0.586 5.210 -0.632 0.296 3.643
R˜b 1.425 0.638 6.985 -0.909 0.224 2.754
Taking a closer look at transparent firms, Table 13 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for quintile
14In the asset pricing literature there is no univocal choice on which percentiles of the distribution one should use for the construction
of the relevant portfolios. For example, Ang et al. (2006) use quintiles, Baker and Wurgler (2006) use deciles, and Ahern (2013) use
terciles. In general, the choice of the relevant percentiles is the result of a trade-off between the need to maximize heterogeneity between
the two portfolios, and the need to ensure a large enough portfolio size. In our case, the top decile selects only a small number of stocks
(as low as 13 in 2005), while terciles fail to identify the top firms in terms of environmental performance and transparency. Robustness
checks using deciles and terciles are presented in Table 11 the Appendix.
15Building portfolios based on the percentiles of the distribution of some relevant firm characteristic is standard in the asset pricing
literature. It should be emphasized, however, that this is a relative approach to the classification of firms. In particular, a firm may
cease to be included in the ‘greenest and more transparent’ portfolio if other firms reduce their emission intensity or improve their
environmental disclosures, or if greener and/or more transparent firms are included in the sample, even if its environmental performance
and transparency are unchanged in absolute terms.
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portfolios 1-5, with portfolio R˜5 being the same as portfolio R˜g, i.e. the top green and transparent portfolio,
while portfolio R˜1 includes comparatively higher emitting and less transparent firms, among those that do some
environmental disclosure. Also in this case, the average return decreases as the level of the greenness and trans-
parency indicator increases, though not monotonically (see Ciciretti et al., 2019 for a similar result based on an
ESG characterization of firms). The same result holds when looking at the Sharpe ratio.
We investigate the drivers of the excess returns for the portfolios described above by considering the reference
models described in Section 4. In particular, Table 2 reports the estimated factor loadings for the Cahart model
(CAR), the three-factor Fama-French model (3FF), and the CAPM. Results are reported for the various portfolios.
Overall, results are in line with the literature with respect to the market, size, value, and momentum factors,
indicating that the portfolios we analyze are rather standard with respect to these dimensions. In particular,
the estimated factor loading for the market factor bˆm is positive and significant across all models and portfolios.
However, for the transparent as well as for the greener and more transparent portfolios, the exposition to the
market factor is lower compared to the non-transparent and brown portfolios. This means that more transparent
and greener firms tend to be less correlated with the market compared to more opaque and browner firms. The
performance of the various portfolios can also be explained by the different loadings on the other factors. In
particular, the exposition with respect to the size factor, bˆsmb, enters with a negative sign for the transparent and
greener and more transparent portfolios, on the one hand, and a positive sign for the non-transparent and brown
portfolios, on the other hand. This suggests that greener and transparent firms correlate more with bigger firms,
while non-transparent and brown firms correlate more with smaller firms. Indeed, based on Table 12, firms in
the greener and more transparent portfolio exhibit a slightly larger mean size as measured by total assets. As
for the value factor bˆhml, the estimated loading is always negative and significant, except for the brown portfolio
for which it is negative but non significant. Negative loadings on the value factor might mean that the portfolios
include a comparatively larger share of firms with a lower book-to-market value. Considering the Carhart model,
the coefficient on the momentum factor is not significant, except for the transparent portfolio. Looking at the
explanatory power of the various models with respect to the different portfolios, the adjusted R-squared is lower
for the brown portfolio based on all the models. Finally, the intercept is positive and significant for all portfolios
and models, suggesting the existence of an omitted factor.
We define the greenness and transparency factor as the difference between the monthly returns on the greener
and more transparent portfolio and those of the brown portfolio. Formally:
fg,t = r˜
g
t − r˜bt . (7)
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the Fama-French observable factors, the momentum and the greenness
and transparency factor. The table includes also the cross-correlation structure among the factors. The greenness
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Table 2: Estimates of linear factor models on portfolio excess returns. The table gathers results for transparent,
green, non-transparent and brown portfolios considering the following linear models: four-factor Carhart model
(CAR), three-factor Fama-French model (3FF) and the CAPM. Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**)
and 10% (*) levels, and the adjusted R-squared (R2adj).
Portfolio R˜ Green R˜c Brown
CAR model
aˆ 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.007***
bˆm 0.953*** 0.945*** 1.061*** 1.112***
bˆsmb -0.208*** -0.261*** 0.476*** 0.702***
bˆhml -0.176*** -0.194*** -0.144** -0.141
bˆmom 0.056*** 0.046 -0.028 0.029
R2adj 0.979 0.947 0.940 0.864
3FF model
aˆ 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.008***
bˆm 0.944*** 0.938*** 1.065*** 1.107***
bˆsmb -0.213*** -0.264*** 0.478*** 0.700***
bˆhml -0.212*** -0.224*** -0.126** -0.159
R2adj 0.978 0.947 0.940 0.865
CAPM
aˆ 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.009***
bˆm 0.899*** 0.891*** 1.032*** 1.063***
R2adj 0.966 0.931 0.916 0.822
and transparency factor is comparable to the other observable factors in terms of mean, standard deviation, kurtosis
and skewness. It is also generally only mildly correlated with the other factors.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the three Fama-French factors, momentum and greenness and transparency factors.
The table reports annualized mean return, standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness, as well as the factor correlation
matrix.
Factor Mean Std Kurt Skewn fm fsmb fhml fmom
fm 6.035 1.885 4.690 -0.642 1
fsmb 1.671 0.641 3.195 -0.129 -0.034 1
fhml -1.378 0.788 3.582 0.519 0.533 -0.062 1
fmom 9.398 1.313 19.610 -2.546 -0.439 -0.009 -0.506 1
fg -4.350 1.291 4.563 0.103 -0.224 -0.483 -0.206 0.268
5.2 Asset pricing analysis
In this section we investigate whether the greenness and transparency factor defined in Equation (7) affects the
cross-section of European stock returns. Further, we test whether investors accept lower (higher) compensation
for holding environmentally friendly stocks by searching for a negative (positive) risk premium, i.e. a Greenium.
The excess return Ri,t follows the model in Equations (2)-(3). In particular, we consider the same linear factor
models used in the previous section, adding the greenness and transparency factor fg among the observable factors
as follows:
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Model Factors K
CAR + G fm,t, fsmb,t, fhml,t, fmom,t, fg,t 5
3FF + G fm,t, fsmb,t, fhml,t, fg,t 4
CAPM + G fm,t, fg,t 2
The risk premium associated with the greenness and transparency factor is defined as follows:
λg = E[fg,t] + νg. (8)
In order to estimate the risk premia for the observable factors using individual stocks, we follow the estimation
procedure proposed in Gagliardini et al. (2016). This procedure allows to deal with unbalanced panels, hence
allowing to estimate the model on individual stocks rather than portfolios, and involves the following steps. First,
we estimate the linear factor model by using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator. Second, we use the
fitted residuals to test whether the model is correctly specified. In particular, we compute the diagnostic criterion
proposed in Gagliardini et al. (2019), which checks whether the error terms share at least one unobserved common
factor. Based on our sample, the criterion does not detect any common factor for the residuals, suggesting the
validity of the factor structure.16 Third, we compute the cross-sectional estimator νk from (3) by Weighted Least
Squares (WLS). Finally, the estimate of the risk premium λˆk for each factor is given by the sum of the expected
return on the factor E[fk,t] and the estimate of νˆk.
Table 4 shows the estimated risk premia attached to the factors, including the Greenium, as well as the estimates
for νk. Looking at the first two columns of the table, almost all risk premia are significant across the board, and
have the expected signs. In particular, the estimated risk premia for the market, size, value and momentum factors
are comparable with the results in Gagliardini et al. (2016) and Chaieb et al. (2018). The estimated Greenium is
negative and significant at the 1% level in all cases. A negative Greenium indicates that investors accept lower
compensation, ceteris paribus, to hold assets that correlate positively with the greenness and transparency factor,
i.e. greener and more environmentally transparent assets. The mainstream interpretation of this result is based
on the assumption that investors only care about their portfolios’ future payoffs. Hence, if they accept a lower
remuneration to hold a certain type of assets, this must be because by doing so they are hedging some risks. In
this specific case, holding greener and more transparent stocks constitutes a hedging strategy against climate risk.
In the case of more environmentally friendly and transparent stocks, however, other considerations may also play
a role. In particular, as suggested by Fama and French (2007), investors decisions may also be driven by some
‘taste for assets’, unrelated to expected returns. In this light, an emerging ‘taste for green’ in the market could also
explain our result.
16For example, for the Carhart model plus the greenness and transparency factor, the difference between the largest eigenvalue of
the empirical cross-sectional covariance matrix of the residuals εˆi,t and the penalization term is negative, pointing to the absence of
omitted factors.
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The last two columns of Table 4 refer to νˆk. Focussing on the greenness and transparency factor, νˆg is always
negative and significant at the 1% level for the CAR+G, and at the 5% for the 3FF+G and CAPM+G models. For
this component of the risk premium, the literature has proposed an interpretation linked to market imperfections
(see, e.g. Daniel and Titman, 1997; Haugen and Baker, 1996). With reference to the Greenium, our hypothesis is
that νg could capture alternative preferences of market participants, for example reflecting alternative expectations
on future states of the economy (see Black and McMillan, 2006). In other words, some of the information that
market participants have may not be fully captured based only on past returns. In this context, the difference
between the investors’ larger information set and the smaller, backward-looking information set on which the model
is estimated could be reflected in νk. This may be true in particular in the case of green and brown assets, in which
case future perspectives may play a comparatively more important role than for other categories of assets.
Table 4: The table reports the estimated annualized premia λˆk and the cross-sectional estimator νˆk for the factors
in the Carhart model and for the greenness and transparency factor. The confidence intervals are reported at the
99% level. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
CAR + G model
λˆm 10.659** νˆm 4.625***
(-4.913, 26.232) (3.876, 5.373)
λˆsmb 3.326** νˆsmb 1.655***
(-1.354, 8.006) (0.682, 2.627)
λˆhml -4.582* νˆhml -3.203***
(-10.723, 1.560 ) (-4.510,-1.896)
λˆmom 8.986** νˆmom -0.412
( -1.463, 19.436) (-3.117, 2.293)
λˆg -9.860*** νˆg -4.076***
(-17.017, -2.702) (-6.221, -1.931 )
3FF + G model
λˆm 10.534* νˆm 4.499***
(-5.038, 26.106) (3.766, 5.231)
λˆsmb 2.634 νˆsmb 0.963***
(-2.046, 7.314) (0.007, 1.918)
λˆhml -5.903** νˆhml -4.525***
(-12.045, 0.238) (-5.812, -3.238)
λˆg -7.545*** νˆg -1.781**
(-14.722, -0.407) (-3.886, 0.325)
CAPM + G
λˆm 11.137* νˆm 5.102***
(-4.435, 26.708) (4.397, 5.807)
λˆg -7.282*** νˆg -1.498**
(-14.440, -0.125) (-3.360, 0.364)
6 Robustness checks
In this section we provide a battery of robustness checks that are summarized in the table below. The exercises are
combinations of the following three dimensions: (i) the definition of the greenness and transparency indicator; (ii)
the reference sample of individual stocks; and (iii) the definition of the greenness and transparency factor.
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Functional form γ Size sample Factor
Rob. 1.1 Eq. (1) 0, 0.2, 0.5 0.8, 1 946 fg,t
Rob. 1.2 Eq. (1) 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, 1 946 f1g,t
Rob. 1.3 Eq. (1) 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, 1 946 f2g,t
Rob. 2.1 Eq. (1) 0, 0.2, 0.5 0.8, 1 2,154 fg,t
Rob. 2.2 Eq. (1) 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, 1 2,154 f1g,t
Rob. 2.3 Eq. (1) 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, 1 2,154 f2g,t
Rob. 3.1 Eq. (9) n.a. 946 fg,t
Rob. 3.2 Eq. (9) n.a. 946 f1g,t
Rob. 3.3 Eq. (9) n.a. 946 f2g,t
Rob. 4.1 Eq. (9) n.a. 2,154 fg,t
Rob. 4.2 Eq. (9) n.a. 2,154 f1g,t
Rob. 4.3 Eq. (9) n.a. 2,154 f2g,t
The first set of exercises (Rob. 1.1 - Rob 2.3) relate to the greenness and transparency indicator as defined in
Equation (1). Rob. 1.1 with γ = 0.5 corresponds to the benchmark specification used in Section 5.2, where we assign
equal weight to the two components of the greenness and transparency indicator, namely the emission intensity and
the environmental transparency of a firm. By tuning the parameter γ, we investigate whether attaching more or less
weight to one of the components of the indicator has an impact on the results. In particular, by imposing γ > 0.5,
we construct an indicator where the quality of a firm’s environmental disclosures has a lower weight compared
to its emission intensity. This version of the indicator attaches a larger weight to hard data and quantitative
information, and a smaller weight to a transparency score which may also rely on descriptive statements and high
level disclosures. Conversely, γ < 0.5 attaches a higher weight to quantitative information and a lower weight to
the overall quality and completeness of environmental disclosures. We also investigate the extreme cases for which
γ = 0 and γ = 1, i.e., the cases for which the indicator Gi,y collapses to the E score Ei,y and to the inverse of the
ranking of emission intensity Ki,y, respectively.
The second set of exercises (Rob. 3.1 - Rob. 4.3) involves a different specification for the greenness and
transparency indicator. In particular, we propose an alternative functional form, where the two components of the
indicator are related to each other in the form of a ratio. In this specification, we use the emission intensity and
the E score as such, while the benchmark specification involves the rankings based on these two indicators. The
alternative definition is thus as follows:
G∗i,y =
E∗i,y
K∗i,y
= E∗i,y
(
Sales
Emissions
)
i,y
, (9)
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where E∗i,y is the E score and K
∗
i,y is the ratio of total GHG or CO2 emissions over sales. Unlike the indicator in
Equation (1), the indicator based on Equation (9) suffers from a non-linearity issue. In particular, a variation in
the denominator corresponds to a more than proportional change in the greenness and transparency indicator. This
nonlinearity yields an unstable pattern for the greenness and transparency indicator over time for some companies.
In a further set of robustness checks (Rob.2.1-2.3 and Rob. 4.1-4.3), we expand our sample to include all listed
European companies which do some environmental disclosure, i.e. have an E score larger than zero, and those
that do no disclosure and belong to brown sectors, as defined in Section 3. By doing so, we more than double
the size of the sample, bringing it to 2,154 stocks. However, as discussed in Section 5, enlarging the sample to
include mid and small caps may affect the quality of the environmental information used to construct the greenness
and transparency indicator. For this reason, in this exercise we still use the greenness and transparency factor as
constructed on the smaller, more reliable sample. In particular, the greener and more transparent portfolio and the
brown portfolio include the same firms as described in Section 3, hence the factor is the same as in the benchmark
exercise described in Section 5. However, this factor is used in Rob.2.1-2.3 and Rob. 4.1-4.3 to price a larger set
of assets. Formally, referring to Equation (2), this set of robustness checks involves the same factors ft,k as in the
benchmark case, but a larger number of stocks N > n.
Additionally, we check the robustness of the results with respect to the definition of the greenness and trans-
parency factor. In the benchmark case (see Section 5.2) as well as in Rob. 1.1, 2.1, 3.1 and 4.1, we build a portfolio
of brown firms selecting the ones belonging to the highest emitting NACE economic sectors, among those that do
no environmental disclosure. However, one could argue that the NACE classification is in some cases unsuitable
for sustainability analysis. Hence, we build an alternative greenness and transparency factor f1g,t based on the
returns on the greener and more transparent portfolio r˜gt , on the one hand, and those of the portfolio including all
non-transparent firms r˜ct , on the other. Formally,
f1g,t = r˜
g
t − r˜ct . (10)
Rob 1.2, 2.2, 3.2, and 4.2 perform the estimation of risk premia using the greenness and transparency factor f1g,t.
Finally, we test yet another specification for the greenness and transparency factor, only based on transparent
firms. In particular, we construct the greenness and transparency factor f2g,t as the difference between the returns
on the greener and more transparent firms and the firms that do some environmental disclosure, but only attain
lower levels of greenness and transparency. The former set of firms correspond to the greener and more transparent
portfolio as defined in Section 5, i.e. the one including firms in the top quintile of the distribution of the greenness
and transparency indicator. The latter set of firms correspond to those in the lower quintile of the distribution
of the greenness and transparency indicator. Formally, the greenness and transparency factor is constructed as
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follows:
f2g,t = r˜
g
t − r˜1t . (11)
Also in this case, we test both specifications of the greenness and transparency indicator on the two samples (see
Rob. 1.3, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.3).
Table 5 reports the estimated Greenium λˆg and the estimated coefficient νˆg for Rob. 1.1 - Rob. 2.3.
17 The results
are based on a four-factor model including the factors in the Carhart model and the greenness and transparency
factor.
Focussing on the Greenium, tuning the parameter γ in the benchmark case (i.e., Rob. 1.1) provides results in
line with the evidence presented in the previous section. The Greenium is always negative and significant at the 1%
confidence level for γ = 0.2, 0.5 and γ = 0.8. Rob. 1.2 and 1.3 use the alternative definitions of the greenness and
transparency factor. Building the factor by considering all nontransparent firms instead of only brown firms (Rob.
1.2) still yields a negative and significant Greenium at the 1% level for γ = 0.5 and γ = 0.8, while it is negative and
significant at the 5% level for γ = 0.2. Building the factor by considering only transparent firms (Rob. 1.3) yields a
negative and significant Greenium for γ = 0.5 and γ = 0.8, at the 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. Notice
that the variation in the size of the Greenium in Rob. 1.2 and 1.3 compared to Rob. 1.1 is purely mechanical, due
to the smaller expected value of f1g,t and f
2
g,t compared to E[fg,t].
Looking at the lower part of Table 5, Rob. 2.1 - 2.3 estimate the model on the larger sample of European
stocks. Considering the benchmark definition for the factor and with γ = 0.5, the Greenium remains negative
and significant at the 10% level. Considering the two alternative definitions for the factor, the Greenium remains
negative and significant at the 5% and 10% level for Rob. 2.2 and Rob. 2.3, respectively. Varying γ on this larger
sample yield a negative Greenium in some instances, but results are generally less strong in terms of significance.
Notably, the specifications based on γ = 1, i.e. using only on emission data, are associated with a non-significant
Greenium on the larger sample as well.
Focussing on the columns corresponding to extreme values for γ, i.e. γ = 0 and γ = 1, allows us to grasp
the importance of the two components of the greenness and transparency indicator. The Greenium is not, or only
mildly, significantly different from zero in most exercises. This indicates that only the combination of emission
intensity and disclosure quality is generally priced by the market. In no case an indicator based on emissions only
(γ = 1) is associated with a significant risk premium, suggesting that investors do not look at emissions only. At
the same time, with γ = 0, i.e. when only the completeness of environmental disclosures matters, the Greenium
is still negative and significant at 5% or 10% in half of the exercises. This finding suggests that investors do pay
attention to the overall quality of firms’ environmental disclosures, over and above their actual emissions.
As for ν, which is linked to the existence of market frictions, the estimates νˆg based on Rob. 1.1. are in line with
17We only report results for the risk premium and the cross-sectional parameter ν corresponding to the greenness and transparency
factor. Estimation results for the other observable factors are available upon request. The results for these factors are in line with the
ones for the benchmark case described in Section 5.2.
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the benchmark case both in terms of sign and significance for γ = 0.2, 0.8, 1 , while νˆg with γ = 0 is not significantly
different from zero. Looking at the other robustness checks, νˆg remains generally significant. However, estimates
of ν tend to lose significance more on the larger sample, because the distribution of the factor loadings bˆi for the
greenness and transparency factor is characterized by a larger standard deviation on the larger sample, compared
to the distribution of the loadings based on the smaller sample.
Finally, Table 6 shows results using the the greenness and transparency indicator defined in Equation (9). The
more unstable behavior of this version of the indicator does not affect the results. The Greenium remains negative
and highly significant with the benchmark factor fg,t as well as with f
1
g,t and f
2
g,t (Rob 3.1 - 3.3). The Greenium is
still negative on the larger sample considering all the three alternatives for the construction of the factor. However,
significance is lower in Rob. 4.2 and Rob. 4.3, while the estimate in Rob. 4.1 is not significant.
Overall, the Greenium remains negative and significant across the majority of the several robustness checks. It
tends to loses statistical significance mostly in extreme cases, when we only consider one of the two components of
the synthetic greenness and transparency indicator.
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Table 5: The table reports results for robustness checks Rob. 1.1 - Rob 2.3. The estimated annualized Greenium λˆg
and the estimated νˆg are computed from the CAR + G model. The greenness and transparency factor is computed
based the indicator Gi,y, with γ = 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, 1 and is defined using the alternative specifications fg,t, f
1
g,t and
f2g,t. Results in the upper part of the table are based on the benchmark sample comprising 946 European individual
stocks, while results in the lower part of the table are based on a larger sample comprising 2, 154 stocks. ***, **
and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
γ = 0 γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.8 γ = 1
n = 946
Rob. 1.1: greenness and transparency factor fg,t
λˆg -5.461* -8.290*** -9.860*** -9.853*** -0.152
νˆg 0.574 -2.860*** -4.076*** -5.554*** -1.477**
Rob. 1.2: greenness and transparency factor f1g,t
λˆg 1.308 -4.611** -6.238*** -7.199*** -2.757
νˆg 6.138*** 4.509*** 3.235*** 0.821 0.808
Rob. 1.3: greenness and transparency factor f2g,t
λˆg -3.222 -1.888 -4.746** -6.648*** 2.853
νˆg 1.534** -1.759*** -3.280*** -6.770*** 1.828***
n = 2, 154
Rob. 2.1: greenness and transparency factor fg,t
λˆg -5.056* -3.699 -5.156* -4.260 3.159
νˆg 0.979 1.731** 0.628 0.071 1.833***
Rob. 2.2: greenness and transparency factor f1g,t
λˆg 3.209 -3.448 -4.531** -5.127** -3.023
νˆg 8.039*** 5.671*** 4.942*** 2.893*** 0.542
Rob. 2.3: greenness and transparency factor f2g,t
λˆg -5.569** -2.781* -3.434* -4.364** 0.990
νˆg -0.813 -2.652*** -1.968*** -4.486*** -0.035
Table 6: The table reports results for robustness checks Rob. 3.1 - Rob 4.3. The estimated annualized Greenium λˆg
and the estimated νˆg are computed from the CAR + G model. The greenness and transparency factor is computed
based the indicator G∗i,y. The greenness and transparency factor is defined using the alternative specifications fg,t,
f1g,t and f
2
g,t. Results in the upper part of the table are based on the benchmark sample comprising 946 European
individual stocks, while results in the lower part of the table are based on a larger sample comprising 2, 154 stocks.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Factor fg,t f
1
g,t f
2
g,t
n = 946 Rob. 3.1 Rob. 3.2 Rob. 3.3
λˆg -8.873*** -6.217*** -5.692***
νˆg -4.313*** 2.031*** -5.303***
n = 2, 154 Rob. 4.1 Rob. 4.2 Rob. 4.3
λˆg -4.330 -5.240** -3.992*
νˆg 0.229 3.008*** -3.603***
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7 Climate stress test on actual holdings
Based on the estimates derived in the previous section, we carry out a climate stress test on actual investors’
equity holdings. We consider the various institutional sectors at the global level, as well as European SIFIs in
particular. The aim of a climate stress test is to measure the exposure of investors to climate risk, in a scenario
where more stringent sustainability-oriented policies are progressively implemented, with increasing pressure on
comparatively more carbon-intensive firms and sectors. In such a scenario, the expected returns on greener stocks
increase, as more sustainable firms are able to distribute higher dividends, while the price of brown stocks drops for
the same reason. Notably, one of the first areas where policy pressure may increase, and is in fact already increasing
in Europe, is that of environmental disclosures. Against this background, firms that have already implemented
suitable non-financial accounting procedures and adopted more advanced environmental reporting standards will
be better off once the non-financial disclosure regulation becomes more stringent. In other words, the expected
return on stocks of more environmentally sustainable and transparent firms conditional to the implementation of
sustainability policies increases. Formally, this implies that the return on the greenness and transparency factor in
Equation (7), which is positively correlated with returns on greener and more transparent stocks, increases.
We test the resilience of investors to climate risk by borrowing data on equity exposures and the classification
of economic sectors into climate-policy-relevant sectors from Battiston et al. (2017). Following the indication
provided by the authors as supplementary information in Table 3, we group individual stocks (see Section 5)
according to their associated NACE code. In particular, we classify stocks in the following economic sectors:
fossil fuels, energy intensive activities, housing, utilities, transport, finance and other. Table 1 in Battiston et al.
(2017) provides aggregate holdings into climate-policy-relevant sectors, as of 2015, for the following institutional
sectors: Individuals, Governments (GOV), Non-Financial Companies (NFCs), Other Credit Institutions (OCIs),
Other Financial Services (OFSs), as well as the institutional financial sectors as defined in the ESA classification,
i.e. Banks, Investment Funds (IFs), and Insurance and Pension Funds (IPFs). Battiston et al. (2017) also classify
equity holdings of individual financial institutions by climate-policy-relevant sectors, obtaining the share of their
portfolio invested into each of these sectors. Based on their data, we focus on European SIFIs, as identified by the
Financial Stability Board.
The equity portfolio of an investor j at time t is defined as follows:
rj,t =
7∑
κ=1
ωκrκ,t, (12)
where ωκ corresponds to the equity exposure to the climate-policy-relevant sector κ and rκ,t is the monthly
average value weighted portfolio return of sector κ.
For each institutional sector and individual bank j, we compute the marginal expected shortfall (MES) intro-
duced by Acharya et al. (2010). The MES is defined as the expected equity loss conditional on a particular factor
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return taking a loss greater than Γ. In this application we estimate the expected equity loss conditional on the
greenness and transparency factor return defined in Equation (7) realizing a gain greater than Γ, i.e. a scenario
where greener and more transparent stocks outperform brown stocks by more than a particular threshold. Hence,
we can write the MES as follows:
MESj,t = −E[rj,t| − fg,t < −Γ], (13)
= −E[rj,t|fg,t > Γ]. (14)
We compute the MES considering the following three cases, which are defined in terms of portfolio allocation:
• Baseline Case: the investors’ portfolio allocation is defined as in Equation (12) and reflects the actual al-
location of institutional sectors and financial institutions as in Battiston et al. (2017). The portfolio share
invested in each of the stocks included in on our sample is derived accordingly.
• Case 1 : the investors’ portfolio allocation is defined as
rj,t =
1
2
ωj,1r1,t +
1
2
ωj,1r
+
t +
7∑
κ=2
ωj,κrκ,t , where the exposure to the fossil fuel sector, characterized by the
highest emissions, is reduced by 50% compared to the baseline. At the same time, we assume that investments
are reallocated to greener and more transparent stocks, defined as the stocks with a positive exposition to the
greenness and transparency factor.
• Case 2 : the investors’ portfolio allocation is defined as rj,t =
7∑
κ=1
ωj,κr
+
κ,t, i.e. only greener and more trans-
parent stocks, as defined above, are included in the portfolio.
In all three cases, the MESj,t is computed w.r.t. the event fg,t > q0.95, where q0.95 indicates the 95
th percentile
of the distribution of the greenness and transparency factor. This corresponds to an extreme, but still plausible
scenario.
Tables 7 and 8 report MES results for the institutional sectors at the global level and for European SIFIs,
respectively. The MES is expressed both as percentage loss and in billions of US dollars. Looking at Table 7,
the average MES at the global level in the baseline scenario, i.e. given the actual portfolio allocation in 2015, is
estimated to be -1.5%. The very limited variation across institutional sectors and institutions indicates that no one
would be immune. A loss of -1.5% on equity portfolios globally corresponds to USD 387 bn. For comparison, this
figure is close to the total disbursements under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), through which the US
Government purchased or insured troubled assets between 2008 and 2014. Table 7 also shows what would happen
should a global portfolio reallocation take place. The figures obtained under Scenario 1 indicate that halving the
exposure to carbon-intensive activities would reduce the MES only marginally. Losses would be avoided only under
Scenario 2, characterized by a radical portfolio reallocation.
Turning to Table 8, we estimate a loss of -1.6%, with individual banks recording losses of up to -2.2% on their
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equity portfolio. An average loss of -1.6% for European SIFIs corresponds to almost USD 7 bn. These figures
are admittedly not breathtaking, and one might argue that losses of this magnitude would be unlike to trigger a
financial crisis. However, this exercise only focuses on equity exposures, and only on first-round losses. Actually,
one should consider that a scenario where greener assets very much outperform brown ones would be rooted into
a deep transformation of the economy as a whole. The low-carbon transition, if implemented in a sudden and
disorderly manner, would be associated with stranded assets and non-performing loans, on top of losses on the
stock market, which would also very much weigh on bank’s profits. In fact, only a comparatively small fraction
of the overall exposure of banks to carbon-intensive economic sectors is due to banks’ equity holdings. Moreover,
the stress-testing literature has shown that second-round effects, such as contagion dynamics, the devaluation of
counterparties’ debt obligations, as well as the price impact of fire sales, may considerably amplify first-round losses.
In particular, works based on network models show that second-round losses are comparable in magnitude to first
round losses (see Battiston et al. (2017) and references therein). Having said that, our data is not granular enough
to estimate the amount of second-round losses that could add up to first-round impacts in a scenario like the one we
are considering. Moreover, the MES-based stress-testing tool we propose is specifically targeted to assess climate
risk in the equity portfolio. However, it’s worth recalling that the global financial crisis, culminating in trillions
of losses in world GDP, was triggered by writedowns on the value of loans and securitized assets due to the US
subprime crisis, which for many banks amounted to just few billions.
Table 7: The table reports the MES in percentage terms and in billions of dollars, for the three scenarios, for
global institutional sectors. The MES is computed conditional to the event fg,t > q0.95.
MES (%) MES (Bn $)
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2
OCIs -1.592 -1.511 0.113 -8.236 -7.821 0.584
Governments -1.411 -1.259 -0.085 -8.169 -7.286 -0.493
Individuals -1.433 -1.383 0.245 -37.270 -35.964 6.375
Banks -1.495 -1.411 0.062 -40.864 -38.553 1.686
IPFs -1.434 -1.339 0.096 -46.529 -43.460 3.119
OFSs -1.447 -1.376 0.200 -50.261 -47.791 6.931
Non-Financial Companies -1.462 -1.355 0.095 -68.476 -63.444 4.469
Investment Funds -1.404 -1.323 0.211 -127.646 -120.310 19.194
Average and Total -1.460 -1.370 0.117 -387.451 -364.630 41.866
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Table 8: The table reports the MES in percentage terms and in billions of dollars, for the three scenarios, for
European SIFIs. The MES is computed conditional to the event fg,t > q0.95.
MES (%) MES (Bn $)
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2
DEUTSCHE BANK AG via its funds -1.455 -1.321 -0.032 -2.348 -2.131 -0.052
BPCE SA via its funds -1.590 -1.539 0.112 -2.325 -2.251 0.164
BNP PARIBAS via its funds -1.621 -1.518 -0.141 -1.090 -1.021 -0.095
UNICREDIT SPA via its funds -1.482 -1.415 0.145 -0.438 -0.418 0.043
BARCLAYS PLC via its funds -1.512 -1.394 -0.079 -0.572 -0.528 -0.030
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG via its funds -1.420 -1.325 0.158 -1.300 -1.212 0.145
BANCO SANTANDER SA -1.912 -1.904 -0.486 -0.155 -0.154 -0.039
UBS GROUP AG via its funds -1.432 -1.314 0.097 -2.604 -2.390 0.176
ING BANK NV -2.225 -2.049 -1.120 -0.042 -0.039 -0.021
SOCIETE GENERALE GESTION -1.571 -1.496 0.088 -0.771 -0.734 0.043
Average and Total -1.647 -1.552 -0.167 -6.971 -6.496 0.222
8 Conclusions and further research
Based on European stocks, we provide evidence of the existence of a pricing factor linked to climate risk and find
that the Greenium, i.e. the associated risk premium, is negative and highly statistically significant. This is a
novel result in the asset pricing literature. We obtain this result because we take greenness and environmental
transparency seriously, unlike studies based on publicly traded funds or indices, which often market themselves
as greener than they actually are. To attenuate the problem of greenwashing, we construct an index of greenness
and environmental transparency at the individual company level, which takes into account both the GHG emission
intensity of a company and the quality of its environmental disclosure. Based on this index we identify the greener
and more transparent companies, while we select brown companies among those that do no disclosure, and operate
in brown sectors. These two portfolios are used to define the greenness and transparency factor. The negative sign
attached to the Greenium indicates that investors buy stacks of greener and more transparent firms accepting a
ceteris paribus lower return, as a hedging strategy to reduce their exposure to climate risk. Based on a battery
of robustness checks, we show that investors take into account both firms’ GHG emissions and the quality of their
environmental disclosures.
In the last part of the paper we use our model to price investors’ equity holdings. We find that their current
portfolio allocation exposes them to non-negligible losses in a severe but plausible scenario, where greener and more
transparent firms outperform brown firms. We estimate that direct losses could amount to 1.5% of the global equity
exposure, and to USD 7 bn for European SIFIs overall. By adding up second-round effects and losses on loans and
other assets, this figure could rapidly increase. We calculate that halving investors’ exposure to carbon-intensive
activities would decrease losses only marginally, while only a radical portfolio reallocation towards greener assets
would ensure resilience. Based on our results, and considering that we only focus on equity exposures, we argue in
favor of introducing climate stress tests for systemic financial institutions to make sure that climate risk is suitably
25
priced. The approach we propose to assess climate risk in equity portfolios is based on a simple and well-known
methodology, the marginal expected shortfall, and could easily become part of a broader stress-testing exercise.
Given that the awareness of investors towards climate-related issues has clearly increased in recent years, it
would make sense to estimate a model with a time-varying risk premium. As discussed, this presents challenges in
terms of estimation, and will be the object of future research. Another interesting avenue relates to the drivers of
the Greenium, and in particular to the hypothesis that its negative sign could be driven by an increasing ‘taste for
green’ among investors.
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Appendix: Additional tables and figures
Figures 2 and 3 show the time-series of the greenness and transparency indicator Gi,y (top panels) for two repre-
sentative companies, as well as their ranking in terms of E score and emission intensity over time. The bottom
panels plot the firms’ E score over time, as well as their emission intensity. NIBE Industrier AB develops solutions
for smart heating and intelligent control in industry and infrastructure. International Airlines Group is the largest
airline group globally. The greenness and transparency indicator for the two companies differs by three orders of
magnitude. For NIBE Industrier AB, the quality and quantity of disclosures have improved over time, together with
a slightly decreasing emission intensity, both resulting in an increasing value for the greenness and transparency
indicator over time. International Airlines Group attained an E score in 2011 which was comparable to that of NIBE
Industrier AB in 2009. However, International Airlines Group’s disclosures only marginally improved over time, if
at all. With respect to emissions, they are obviously incomparably larger for airlines than for many other companies.
31
NIBE Industrier AB
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Figure 2: Greenness and transparency indicator GNIBE,y, E score and emissions intensity in ranked and row values,
of the NIBE Industrier AB.
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Figure 3: Greenness and transparency indicator GIntAir,y, E score and emissions intensity in ranked and raw values,
of the International Airlines Group.
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Table 9: List of highest-emitting economic sectors. Source: Eurostat.
Description NACE Rev 2 Code
Mining of coal and lignite B05
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas B06
Mining of metal ores B07
Mining support service activities B09
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products C19
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products C20
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products C22
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products C23
Manufacture of basic metals C24
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment C25
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply D35
Sewerage E37
Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery E38
Remediation activities and other waste management services E39
Land transport and transport via pipelines H49
Water transport H50
Air transport H51
Table 10: List of brown companies in 2017.
Company Name NACE code Company Name NACE code
Lubelski Wegiel Bogdanka SA B05 Ibstock PLC C23
Genel Energy Plc B06 Rhi Magnesita NV C23
Norwegian Energy Co ASA B06 Bossard Holding AG C25
BHP Billiton PLC B07 Beijer Alma AB C25
Grupa Kety SA B07 Indus Holding AG C25
Stalprodukt SA B07 Boryszew SA C25
Alumetal SA B07 Mennica Polska SA C25
Elkem ASA B07 SFS Group AG C25
Northern Drilling Ltd B09 Fiskars OYJ Abp C25
Bonheur ASA B09 Elektrobudowa SA D35
Borr Drilling Ltd B09 Kogeneracja D35
Shelf Drilling Ltd B09 BKW AG D35
Odfjell Drilling Ltd B09 Arendals Fossekompani A/S D35
EMS-Chemie Holding AG C20 Nobina AB H49
Ciech SA C20 PKP Cargo SA H49
Tikkurila Oyj C20 Dfds A/S H50
Tessenderlo Group SA C20 Fjord1 ASA H50
Recticel SA C22 Ocean Yield ASA H50
Sanok Rubber Co SA C22 Frontline Ltd/Bermuda H50
Forbo Holding AG C22 Wizz Air Holdings Plc H51
Vidrala SA C23
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Table 11: Estimated annualized risk premia λˆk and the cross-sectional estimator νˆk for the factors in the Carhart
model and the greenness and transparency factor fg,t as in Equation (7). The factor fg,t is built based on the deciles
and terciles of the distribution of the greenness and transparency indicator. Confidence intervals are reported at
the 99% level. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: greener and more transparent portfolio includes top decile firms
λˆm 10.592* νˆm 4.557***
(-4.982, 26.164) (3.805, 5.309)
λˆsmb 3.306* νˆsmb 1.635***
(-1.375, 7.986) (0.65, 2.62)
λˆhml -4.805** νˆhml -3.427***
(-10.947, 1.337) (-4.745, -2.109)
λˆmom 9.203** νˆmom -0.196
(-1.247, 19.653) (-2.881, 2.491)
λˆg -10.479*** νˆg -4.948***
(-17.298, -3.661) (-7.187, -2.708)
Panel B: greener and more transparent portfolio includes top tercile firms
λˆm 10.669* νˆm 4.634***
(-4.904, 26.241) (3.886, 5.383)
λˆsmb 3.471* νˆsmb 1.8***
(-1.21, 8.151) (0.828, 2.772)
λˆhml -4.635* νˆhml -3.257***
(-10.776, 1.507) (-4.56, -1.953)
λˆmom 8.246** νˆmom -1.152
(-2.204, 18.696) (-3.968, 1.664)
λˆg -8.612*** νˆg -3.331***
(-15.787, -1.437) (-5.428, -1.234)
Table 12: Companies’ fundamentals (year 2017). The table reports descriptive statistics for size (measured by the
log of total assets), leverage and RoA, considering companies included in the various portfolios.
Portfolio
Size Leverage RoA
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
R˜1 9.683 1.013 25.933 16.168 6.619 5.790
R˜2 9.368 1.099 23.027 15.349 6.474 6.825
R˜3 9.440 1.258 22.208 16.330 6.685 6.741
R˜4 9.496 1.201 22.019 14.405 6.977 7.577
R˜g 9.513 1.184 23.466 15.666 5.526 6.585
R˜ 9.473 1.158 23.196 15.365 6.627 6.922
R˜c 9.368 1.201 24.018 16.372 7.187 8.208
R˜b 9.433 1.164 24.888 17.461 7.163 8.077
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for portfolios including transparent firms. The table reports the mean and standard
deviation (Std), kurtosis (Kurt) and skewness (Skew), the Sharpe ratio, t-stat for the null hypothesis that the mean
return is zero. Portfolio R˜5 is the top green and transparent.
Portfolio Mean Std Kurt Skew Sharpe t-stat
R˜1 1.065 0.503 3.579 -0.099 0.212 2.611
R˜2 1.160 0.547 5.257 -0.684 0.212 2.617
R˜3 0.786 0.530 4.175 -0.391 0.148 1.827
R˜4 0.920 0.489 3.445 -0.232 0.188 2.317
R˜5 0.943 0.502 4.097 -0.593 0.188 2.315
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Table 14: Estimates of linear factor models on various portfolios including transparent firms, with an increasing
degree of greenness and transparency from 1 to 4. Results are reported for the following models: four-factor Carhart
model (CAR), three-factor Fama-French model (3FF) and the CAPM. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Portfolio R˜1 R˜2 R˜3 R˜4
CAR model
aˆ 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.004***
bˆm 0.925*** 1.004** 0.991*** 0.931***
bˆsmb -0.119 -0.052 -0.202*** -0.255***
bˆhml -0.103 -0.289*** -0.317*** -0.205***
bˆmom 0.144*** -0.057 -0.050 0.086***
R2adj 0.878 0.916 0.941 0.938
3FF model
aˆ 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.005***
bˆm 0.902*** 1.014*** 0.999*** 0.916***
bˆsmb -0.131 -0.048 -0.198*** -0.262***
bˆhml -0.194** -0.252*** -0.285*** -0.260***
R2adj 0.87 0.915 0.940 0.935
CAPM
aˆ 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.003** 0.005***
bˆm 0.860*** 0.958*** 0.938*** 0.861***
R2adj 0.864 0.908 0.926 0.917
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